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DELEGATING AWAY THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: REVIEWING
INA § 287(g) AGREEMENTS
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY
MATTHEW A. SMITH

*

INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the Obama administration announced that it
would not renew its agreements with state and local law enforcement
agencies under section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality
1
Act. If the administration follows through on this announcement, it
will bring to a close a program that has provoked its share of
controversy. Debate over the constitutionality of the federal-local
agreements authorized under section 287(g) has raised a range of
2
structural questions about the nature of American federalism.

* Attorney, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll. BA Columbia University, 2006. JD/LLM Duke
University School of Law, 2011. The author would like to thank Joseph Blocher, Margaret Hu,
David Martin, Hiroshi Motomura, and Juliet Stumpf for their comments on this Article.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); see Press
Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End
Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer
Guidelines to Further Focus Resources (December 21, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm (“ICE has also decided not to renew any of its
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies that operate task forces under the
287(g) program.”).
2. See generally Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and
Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459 (2008) (arguing in favor of
local immigration enforcement); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously,
2007 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (same); see also Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension
of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008) (arguing that the federal government
may delegate immigration enforcement authority but that the 287(g) program allows too much
discretion to be constitutionally permissible); Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local
in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (arguing that local jurisdictions
possess inherent authority to regulate immigration but their authority to do so has been
preempted by federal statutes). But see Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent
Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the
Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2004) (arguing that states lack inherent authority to
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Commentators on one side of this debate have asserted that states
possess the authority to enforce immigration law as an inherent
3
aspect of their residual sovereignty. Those at the opposite end have
argued that the power to regulate immigration belongs exclusively to
the federal government and is incapable of being delegated to the
4
states.
Disagreement about state and local governments’ authority over
immigration raises a vexing set of issues regarding the scope of these
5
governments’ power to enforce federal immigration law. Although
the implications for federalism of the 287(g) program have been
6
canvassed, the program’s implications for the constitutional role of
the Executive Branch have not received the same attention—even
though the Executive Branch may have more at stake in this
discussion than any other institutional actor. In particular, because the
287(g) program confers immigration enforcement power on officials
who are not formally part of the Executive Branch, the program
provides an opportunity to consider the implications of delegating
federal immigration enforcement authority for the constitutional
theory of the unitary executive.
The analysis of the 287(g) program presented in this Article runs,
in effect, in two directions. The development of the unitary executive
theory, as expounded by the Supreme Court and by scholars of
executive power, opens an avenue to curtail the operation of
programs that, like the 287(g) program, permit state and local officials
7
to enforce federal immigration law. At the same time, doctrinal
regulate immigration); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004) (same); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493
(2001) [hereinafter Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry] (arguing that federal power to regulate
immigration cannot be delegated without imperiling equal protection norms).
3. E.g., Kobach, supra note 2.
4. E.g., Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry, supra note 2.
5. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (engaging with this topic
in the context of a preemption challenge).
6. See discussion supra note 2.
7. For an early and comprehensive defense of the unitary executive thesis, see generally
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541 (1994). Several of the Supreme Court’s most prominent, and controversial,
holdings regarding the scope of executive power have advanced this unitary executive theory.
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010)
(invalidating the double-for-cause removal provision of an independent financial regulatory
agency because the provision impermissibly encroached upon presidential supervisory
authority); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997) (invalidating interim provisions
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act in part on the ground that they would “shatter”
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analysis of the 287(g) program affords an opportunity to examine the
limits of the unitary executive theory and to explore the practical
implications of a strict application of its tenets. This essay explores
both themes.
Part I of this essay begins by highlighting those aspects of the
287(g) program that give rise to doubts about the program’s
consistency with the unitary executive theory. In particular, this Part
reviews the findings of empirical research demonstrating that, despite
the Obama administration’s efforts to revise its 287(g) agreements to
focus on federally defined priorities, the divergence in state and local
implementation of these agreements has persisted. The increased
supervisory functions adopted by the administration’s revised
agreements have not enabled Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) to achieve consistency with federal policy objectives. What was
8
hailed by its proponents as the force-multiplying solution to the
perceived inadequacy of federal enforcement has splintered the
national Executive’s ability to pursue a coherent national policy.
With this empirical framework in place, Part II explores potential
challenges to the 287(g) program based on the Supreme Court’s
precedents that have developed the unitary executive theory. At the
outset, this section notes that the underlying statute itself is written
broadly and is therefore probably impervious to a facial Take Care
9
Clause challenge. But if framed as an “as applied” challenge to the
287(g) program carried out under the Obama administration’s revised
287(g) agreements, a challenge grounded in both the Appointments
10
Clause and the Take Care Clause would raise important questions
about whether the program exerts adequate executive control over
state and local law enforcement’s exercise of their delegated

the president’s unitary powers); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926) (holding that
Congress may not predicate removal of executive officers on the advice and consent of the
Senate in part on the ground that “[A]rticle 2 grants to the President the executive power of the
government . . . a conclusion confirmed by [the President’s] obligation to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed”).
8. See Kris Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALBANY L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) (arguing that the
assistance of local police officers in immigration enforcement “represent[s] a massive force
multiplier”).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).
10. Id. § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”).
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immigration functions. One argumentative approach concentrates on
formal problems with the manner in which 287(g) officers are
appointed and removed from their positions. Because 287(g) officers
are not appointed to their positions as state and local officials by the
President or by one of his subordinates and are charged with
simultaneously carrying out executive and non-executive functions,
these officers are not sufficiently subject to the President’s power of
appointment to preserve the unitary executive. Further, because
287(g) officers may be removed from their positions at any time by
their superiors in state or local government without the consent of the
President or his subordinates, they are not fully within the removal
power of the President, as the unitary executive theory requires.
A second line of attack maintains that the President’s ability to
supervise 287(g) officers is not sufficient to satisfy the unitary
executive. This argument focuses on functional difficulties in ensuring
that 287(g) officers are sufficiently controlled by and accountable to
the Executive Branch in the course of performing their delegated
functions.
I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: THE EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR TAKE
CARE CLAUSE CONCERNS
Enacted in 1996 as an amendment to the Immigration and
11
Nationality Act, section 287(g) authorizes the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to enter into written agreements
with state and local law enforcement agencies permitting officers of
these agencies to perform the functions of federal immigration
12
officers. The designated law enforcement agency acts pursuant to an
agreement with ICE under the supervision of the Department of
13
Homeland Security. The agreement establishes rules governing the
local agency’s exercise of federal immigration authority and
designates the officers authorized to perform immigration functions,
the immigration powers that the officers are authorized to perform,
and the federal entity that will supervise the local agency’s use of its

11. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
12. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006). The
authority granted by section 287(g) was transferred from the Attorney General to the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 when immigration enforcement was
consolidated in the Department of Homeland Security.
13. See id. § 287(g)(3).

SMITH 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

DELEGATING AWAY THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

10/21/2013 8:18 PM

201

14

delegated authority.
In July 2009, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano announced that ICE would structure its agreements with
local law enforcement authorities under section 287(g) according to a
new standardized Memorandum of Agreement, which would serve as
15
a template for future 287(g) agreements. The template was adopted
in part to allay criticisms that the program had allowed local
authorities too much discretion, which had led to pronounced
divergences between state and local enforcement practices and
16
federal enforcement priorities. In particular, the template agreement
provided that state and local agencies participating in the 287(g)
program should prioritize enforcement against aliens who had been
17
arrested for, or convicted of, major drug offenses or violent crimes.
Public statements by senior Obama administration officials confirmed
that the administration viewed the 287(g) program as focused on
detecting immigration status violations by “dangerous criminal
18
aliens.” Through the use of the new template, ICE sought to
minimize divergence from this federal program goal by “align[ing]
287(g) local operations with major ICE enforcement priorities—
19
specifically, the identification and removal of criminal aliens.”

14. See id. § 287(g)(5).
15. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secretary Napolitano
Announces New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships and
Adds 11 New Agreements (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release], available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0907/090710washington.htm.
16. See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(g) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 11
(2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf (surveying
criticisms).
17. See Memorandum of Agreement Template, app. D [hereinafter Memorandum of
Agreement], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/287g_moa.pdf.
18. Press Release, supra note 15; see also Testimony of Assistant Secretary John Morton
Before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/
04/16/assistant-secretary-john-mortons-testimony-us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement
(“The new MOA requires that our partners align local operations with key enforcement
priorities—the arrest and detention of criminal aliens who pose the greatest threat to the public
safety or danger to the community.”).
19. Press Release, supra note 15.
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By October 2009, ICE had renegotiated all of its existing 287(g)
20
agreements to conform to the new template; however, enforcement
practices continued to vary among jurisdictions and to diverge from
21
the priorities outlined in the revised agreements. For example, in the
first ten months after all existing 287(g) agreements had been
updated, one half of all immigration detainers issued in eight
jurisdictions were placed upon non-citizens arrested for traffic
offenses, non-criminal violations, and violations that fell within the
22
lowest-priority enforcement category under the revised agreements.
Over the same period, more than sixty percent of immigration
detainers issued pursuant to 287(g) agreements in place in Cobb
County, Georgia, and Frederick County, Maryland, were imposed on
23
traffic offenders, whereas less than a quarter of detainers were
issued to non-citizens whose offenses fell within high-priority
24
categories as defined in the template agreement. Similarly, a review
of four 287(g) agreements conducted by the Department of
Homeland Security’s Inspector General in 2010 revealed that only
half of the detainers issued by these programs were placed on noncitizens whose offenses corresponded to the enforcement priorities
25
articulated in the agreement template.
In contrast, enforcement practices were more aligned with federal
26
priorities in some jurisdictions, such as in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Overall, enforcement patterns differed widely among jurisdictions
participating in the 287(g) program, both in comparison to the
program goals articulated in the revised 287(g) agreements and
between participating jurisdictions themselves.

20. See CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., A PROGRAM IN FLUX:
NEW PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR 287(g) 10 (2010).
21. See CAPPS, supra note 16, at 4 (“In sum, the statutory language of section 287(g), the
Obama administration’s statements and guidelines, and ICE’s implementation practices allow
jurisdictions to operate the 287(g) program in fundamentally different ways across the
country.”).
22. See id. at 18–19.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 19 fig. 2.
25. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE
PERFORMANCE OF 287(g) AGREEMENTS 9 (March 2010), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/
assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf.
26. See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 16, at 19.
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Even more troubling for federal policymakers seeking consistency
in the enforcement of immigration law, some ICE regional supervisors
established enforcement priorities according to state and local
27
political pressures. Thus, although regional ICE personnel were
28
intended to ensure consistency in enforcement, their supervision did
not necessarily translate into local accountability to national program
29
goals.
In sum, the reforms announced in 2009 do not appear to have
eliminated the major problem identified by critics of the 287(g)
program—that the 287(g) agreements inverted the relationship
between federal and local immigration enforcement, so that federal
law became an instrument of local preferences rather than of national
policy. With the primary responsibility to carry out immigration
screening in the hands of local authorities, local biases and
30
preferences defined the prioritization of enforcement efforts.
Indeed, in several well-documented instances, 287(g) program
participants abused the authority delegated under section 287(g) to
31
carry out racial profiling. According to these findings, rather than
32
helping implement national policy as “force multipliers,” local
authorities exploited the mantle of immigration enforcement to carry
33
out local priorities. This is not a portrait of state and local entities
expanding the resources available to the Chief Executive to carry out
a concerted national policy. It is instead a process of fragmentation

27. Id. at 28 (reporting that “all of the 287(g) programs represent a response to state and
local political pressures[] rather than . . . national enforcement priorities”).
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 26–28 (discussing findings that state and local program goals often derive
from political pressures).
31. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Bill Montgomery,
Cnty. Att’y, Maricopa Cnty. (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Bill Montgomery]
(documenting the pattern of racial profiling carried out by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Office, a 287(g) program participant); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Clyde B. Albright, Cnty. Att’y, Alamance Cnty. (Sept. 18, 2012) (documenting the pattern of
racial profiling carried out by Alamance County Sheriff’s Office, a 287(g) program participant);
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA., THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING IN
GWINNETT: TIME FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND AN END TO 287(g) (2010),
available at www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/1504/392/ (documenting racial profiling
carried out by the Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Office, a 287(g) program participant).
32. See generally Kobach, supra note 8 (arguing that state and local authorities “multiply”
the resources available for enforcement of national immigration priorities).
33. See CAPPS, supra note 16, at 26–28 (describing 287(g)’s impact in local sheriff’s
elections).
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that undermines the President’s ability to formulate a coherent
approach to immigration enforcement.
II. THE 287(g) PROGRAM IN TENSION WITH THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE THEORY
Based on the persistent difficulties encountered in conforming the
287(g) program to the policy expectations embodied in the Obama
administration’s template Memorandum of Agreement, this Part
analyzes flaws in the implementation of the 287(g) program through
the lens of the unitary executive theory. At the outset it should be
stressed that the constitutional flaws discussed here arise from the
Obama administration’s implementation of the program rather than
from the face of the statute itself. Generally, the Take Care Clause of
Article II raises constitutional concerns for statutes that facially
interfere with the President’s ability to implement federal law. For
example, a recent Supreme Court decision struck down “double for
cause” limitations on the President’s power to remove directors of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board on the ground that this
second “for cause” requirement impermissibly limited the President’s
34
control over these directors. In contrast, the broad provisions of
section 287(g) do not, on their face, limit the President’s executive
35
authority.
Notwithstanding the statute’s probable immunity from facial
challenge, several features of the Obama administration’s
implementation of the statute stand in tension with the Take Care
Clause and Appointments Clause as understood by proponents of the
unitary executive theory. First, the Obama administration’s
implementation of section 287(g) may be vulnerable because state
officials exercising federal immigration enforcement authority under
the 287(g) program are not appointed to their offices as state officials
36
by the President. This feature of the program disrupts the formal
unity of the Executive Branch that is privileged by the unitary
executive theory.

34. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163
(2010).
35. Instead, section 287(g) authorizes the President to enter into agreements with local law
enforcement agencies, subject to certain eligibility requirements. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. §
1357(g)(1)–(10) (West 2013).
36. See infra Part II.B.
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The 287(g) agreements are also vulnerable to arguments
emphasizing the functional limits that the 287(g) program places upon
executive control. Officers designated to perform immigration
enforcement functions under the program may be removed from their
offices at any time by their superiors in state or local government,
without the consent of the Chief Executive. This feature deprives the
President of necessary control over the enforcement of federal
immigration law by making officers who are entrusted with executive
power removable without the consent of the President or his
subordinates. Further, insofar as the agreements contemplate local
authorities carrying out immigration functions simultaneously with
enforcing local laws, often alternating from one posture to the other
37
in a single operation, the 287(g) program confuses instances in which
officers act in their federal immigration enforcement capacity with
situations where they act under their local police powers. The amount
of federal supervision ostensibly devoted to program participants is
inconsequential if supervisors are unable to make ex ante distinctions
between situations in which their guidance is required and situations
in which their supervisees will engage in purely local law enforcement
activity and the ICE Standard Operating Procedure gives federal
38
agents no role.
After reviewing the elemental concepts of the unitary executive
theory that are common to all three arguments, these arguments will
be explored in light of the relevant Supreme Court precedents.

37. The standard agreement template anticipates that local agency officials to whom
immigration authority is delegated will carry out immigration-related activities simultaneously
with their normal law enforcement responsibilities. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note
17, at 18–21 (illustrating the task force model template); id. at 21–23 (explaining the jail model
template). The difficulty of distinguishing the limits of delegated immigration-related authority
is heightened in the case of task force model enforcement, which contemplates that 287(g)
officers will carry out immigration functions “during the course of criminal investigations[.]” See
id. at 19.
38. See infra Part II.B. This problem is particularly likely to arise in jurisdictions operating
under the “task force” model. See discussion supra note 37. Inevitably, task force 287(g) officers
and their ICE supervisors are unable to anticipate every situation in which an operation
designed to enforce local law will lead to the discovery of an immigration violation that
implicates the authority granted by the governing MOA. Similarly, ICE supervision can do little
to prevent 287(g) officers from engaging in pretextual use of their police powers in an encounter
with a suspected alien, as these encounters begin as—and arguably remain—exclusively an
exercise of police power. Cf. Letter to Bill Montgomery, supra note 31 (discussing findings
related to Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office’s pretextual immigration enforcement practices).
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A. Thematic Elements of the Unitary Executive
Although, as this section will argue, the unitary executive theory
has also guided majority decisions of the Supreme Court, the theory’s
most comprehensive doctrinal articulation from the Court appears in
39
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson. As described by Justice
Scalia in Morrison, the unitary executive theory dictates that “[i]t is
not for [the courts] to determine . . . how much of the purely executive
powers of the government must be within the full control of the
40
President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are.” The unitary
executive theory is highly formalistic in its approach. In an influential
41
article defending the theory, Professors Calabresi and Prakash
referred to the structural framing of government in the Constitution’s
first three articles as “An Exclusive Trinity of Powers” that establishes
three branches of government, each possessing mutually exclusive
powers, and precludes the possibility of there being any other
42
branch. Calabresi and Prakash also set forth a textualist
interpretation of both the Take Care Clause and the surrounding
43
provisions of Article II, and found confirmation for their
interpretation in the pre- and post-ratification history of the
44
Constitution.
As explained by Justice Scalia in his Morrison dissent, the first
inquiry in determining whether the unitary executive theory is
implicated by a particular exercise of authority is to consider whether
45
the activity in question is an “exercise of purely executive power.”
This inquiry is resolved by looking to whether the Executive Branch
is normally charged with carrying out the activity in question without
46
the involvement of the Legislative or Judicial Branches. If the
authority being exercised is found to be a “purely executive” one, the
next question is whether the President has been deprived of

39. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
40. Id. at 709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 7.
42. Id. at 564.
43. Id. at 570–99.
44. Id. at 601–62.
45. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. See id. (discussing the historical practice of the Executive Branch as being solely
responsible for carrying out criminal prosecutions); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Under the text
of our Constitution, a single President possesses the entirety of the ‘executive power’ . . . and the
entire authority to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1)).
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“exclusive control over the exercise of that power.” In the event that
the officer discharging the executive function is found not to be “fully
within the supervision and control of the President,” for example,
because of impermissible constraints on the President’s power to
remove the officer, as in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
48
Accounting Oversight Board, the exercise of executive authority by
the officer unconstitutionally “denigrate[s] the President’s power by
49
circumventing the Executive Branch.”
The unitary executive theory has emerged as an influential
interpretation of Article II that is capable of marshaling the support
50
of a majority of the Justices. In Printz v. United States, the Court
struck down provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act that required state law enforcement authorities to carry out
interim provisions of the Act. In a holding that stood independently of
the Court’s “commandeering” rationale, the Court invalidated the
challenged provisions on Article II grounds. In so doing, the Court
endorsed the unitary executive theory as an alternative basis for its
holding, concluding that the unity of the Executive Branch “would be
51
shattered” if the statute’s delegation of executive power in the hands
of state officers were upheld. More recently, in Free Enterprise Fund,
the Court again implemented the precepts of the unitary executive
theory, this time by invalidating a double-for-cause removal limitation
on the President’s authority to remove inferior officers. The unitary
executive theory animated the logic of the Court’s decision, as Chief
Justice Roberts’s majority opinion stressed that the double-for-cause
limitation contravened principles that are privileged by the unitary
executive, including Article II’s formal “vesting of executive power in
52
the President,” and the necessity of ensuring the accountability of
53
inferior officers through the electoral process. Notwithstanding that
the unitary executive theory’s most comprehensive articulation
appears in Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent, the theory has

47. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. 130 S. Ct. 3138, (2010); see id. at 3163 (invalidating double-for-cause removal
provision).
49. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United States,
367 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (paraphrasing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922
(1997)).
50. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
51. Id. at 923.
52. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154.
53. See id. at 3154–56.
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demonstrated very real vitality in animating the modern Court’s
approach to Article II.
B. Appointment and Removal Power Objections to the Obama
Administration’s 287(g)Template Agreements
Unitary executive theorists regard the Take Care Clause and the
54
Appointments Clauses as two sides of the same presidential monism.
Thus, proponents of the theory have written that sufficient
presidential control over those exercising executive authority requires
that “at a minimum, the President must have some measure of the
55
‘power to appoint and remove’ those exercising that power.”
This minimum requirement of the unitary executive presents
formal difficulties for the Obama administration’s revised 287(g)
agreements. There can be no doubt that the state and local law
enforcement officials deputized by the 287(g) program are officers
exercising the powers of the Federal Executive. The statute itself
permits the Secretary of Homeland Security to delegate to state and
local officials the power “to perform the function of an immigration
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of
56
aliens in the United States . . . .” In turn, the model Standard
Operating Procedure adopted in 2009 by ICE expressly references
the sources in statute and regulation of the federal authority that is
57
conferred upon local agencies that enter into 287(g) agreements.
Thus, the first requirement for showing an abrogation of the unitary
executive—that the activity in question be an exercise of purely
58
executive power—is easily met by the 287(g) program.
That state and local authorities who participate in the 287(g)
program are appointed to their positions as state and local officers by
powers outside the control of the President stands in tension with the
requirements of the unitary executive. As the Court has observed,
“[t]he Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer
the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, ‘shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ personally and through officers
54. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 7, at pt. II (considering the textual basis
for the unitary executive).
55. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
56. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g) (West 2013).
57. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 17, at appx. D. (delineating authority
delegated to participants in the task force officer model and jail model agreements).
.
58 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 653, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (outlining
rudimentary two-part test for an infringements of the unitary executive’s power).
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whom he appoints” or through appointees of subordinate officers of
59
the Executive Branch. Several of the Justices have repeatedly
questioned whether the exercise of executive authority can be
60
permissible absent presidential power to appoint.
The apparent counterargument is that the template Memorandum
of Agreement makes clear that individual officers’ involvement in the
287(g) program is subject to the approval of ICE, and that ICE
retains the power to withdraw the immigration authority delegated to
these officers at will. Thus, it may be said that even if the President
does not have the power to vest the 287(g) official with all of that
official’s power, the relevant federal power nevertheless devolves to
the state official from the President. Accordingly, it might be argued
that even if the President cannot appoint these officers to their
positions as state or local officials, the President retains sufficient
power over the appointment of these officers to satisfy the unitary
executive.
However, even allowing that the 287(g) program permits
presidential subordinates to approve individual officers’ exercise of
federal immigration authority, this arrangement disrupts the formal
unity that the unitary executive theory seeks to preserve. The
61
Constitution entrusts all executive power to “a single President” and
includes among its “structural protections” the consolidation of
executive power in the hands of those who are subordinate only to
62
the Chief Executive. According to this formal understanding of
Article II, placing executive power in the hands of officers who are
appointed by both the Chief Executive and by state or local
government erodes the unity of the Executive Branch by dividing
control over and accountability of 287(g) officers between two
63
executives. In addition, because 287(g) officers may be responsible
for discharging both their executive and non-executive functions in
59. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3).
60. Id. (questioning whether there can be “meaningful Presidential control” absent “the
power to appoint and remove” the officer exercising executive functions); Lara, 541 U.S. at 216
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the appointment and removal power is a minimal
requirement of executive control).
61. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 689 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
62. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010)
(quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986)).
63. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 922 (emphasizing the role of the unitary executive in ensuring
accountability for subordinates’ conduct).
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64

the midst of the same law enforcement activity, the 287(g) program
threatens the unitary executive’s separation of executive from nonexecutive functions. Both features of the 287(g) program conflict with
the “structural protections” that, according to the unitary executive
theory, are embodied by Article II.
The 287(g) program’s incompatibility with the unitary executive
theory is even more pronounced in the conditions of removal of
287(g) officers. Both the power to appoint and the power to remove
are indispensable to the unity of the Executive, because “as [the
President’s] selection of administrative officers is essential to the
execution of the laws by him, so must be his power of removing those
65
for whom he cannot continue to be responsible.” The President’s
power of removal is exclusive in regard to officers who, like 287(g)
66
67
officers, are charged with carrying out “purely executive” functions.
However, in the case of the 287(g) program, participating officers are
subject to removal by their superiors in state or local government in
addition to the Chief Executive’s power to revoke their authority to
enforce immigration law. At any point, these state or local officials
may terminate a 287(g) officer’s employment or limit the scope of his
or her duties, regardless of whether ICE or any other federal program
administrator accountable to the President agrees. In simplest terms,
an officer may be removed from her position, notwithstanding that
the President approves of her performance.

64. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
65. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
653, 709 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is not for us to determine, and we have never
presumed to determine, how much of the purely executive powers of government must be
within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are.”).
66. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. Further, the law enforcement functions
of 287(g) officers are in no way “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial,” see Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), nor are they functions for which independence from
the Executive Branch is desirable, see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 603 (noting that limitation on
removal of independent counsel was considered “essential . . . to establish the necessary
independence of office”). Thus, even under the approach to the removal power articulated in
Humphrey’s Executor and by the Court in Morrison, the President’s removal power of 287(g)
officers may not be limited. See Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628 (“[A]n executive officer
restricted to the performance of executive functions . . . is merely one of the units in the
executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable removal
power by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is.”).
67. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Myers, 272 U.S. at 122 (“[T]he
power to remove [subordinates] may therefor be regarded as confined for very sound and
practical reasons[] to the governmental authority which has administrative control.”).
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As a consequence of this division of supervisory authority and
accountability, it is as true in the case of the 287(g) program as it was
in Free Enterprise Fund that “[n]either the President, nor anyone
directly responsible to him, nor even an officer whose conduct he may
68
review only for good cause, has full control over” 287(g) officers,
because these officers may be removed from their positions by, and
69
held accountable to, superiors other than the Chief Executive. As in
Free Enterprise Fund, this “diffusion of power carries with it a
70
diffusion of accountability,” a result that the unitary executive does
71
not tolerate. Further, the fact that the 287(g) agreements allow ICE
to revoke the participation of a local law enforcement agency
unilaterally does not redeem this constitutional flaw. Indeed, the
Court rejected a similar argument in Free Enterprise Fund itself,
where the Court refused to find that the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s authority to strip a subordinate board’s powers cured
the constitutional defect in the Commission’s lack of adequate power
72
to remove individual members of the Board. Accordingly, the 287(g)
program disrupts the unitary executive’s exclusive power to remove
those entrusted with carrying out purely executive functions.
Moreover, the response that the Executive Branch itself, rather
than Congress, has yielded its executive authority to state officials in
the 287(g) program provides no answer to these objections. According
to the unitary executive theory, the Take Care Clause of Article II not
only authorizes, but also obligates the President to exercise control
over those entrusted with executive powers. Thus, the President
“cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to
supervise that goes with it because Article II makes a single President
73
responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch.” The President

68. Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732 (1986) (holding that Congress may not retain
authority to remove an official entrusted with executive powers).
70. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155.
71. See id.; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (“The insistence of the
Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive—to ensure both vigor and accountability—is well
known.”).
72. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158 (“Broad power over Board functions is not
equivalent to the power to remove Board members.”).
73. Id. at 3154 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
653, 693 (discussing the President’s “constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of
the laws”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 52 (1926) (affirming that the President’s
“administrative control of those executing the laws” is the corollary of “his obligation to take
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cannot avoid the obligation to ensure faithful execution of the laws by
vesting this responsibility in officers who, like 287(g) officers, are only
partially subject to presidential control and for whose actions the
74
President cannot be held solely accountable.
Accordingly, because the recipients of the immigration authority
delegated by the 287(g) agreements are not appointed to their offices
by the President or by someone acting on his behalf, are removable by
authorities other than the President and without the President’s
consent, and are entrusted with carrying out executive and non75
executive functions simultaneously,
the program violates
fundamental principles of the unitary executive theory.
C. Constitutional Inadequacy of the 287(g) Supervisory Provisions
In addition to these flaws in the manner of appointing state
officers involved in the 287(g) program, the delegation of executive
power effected by the 2009 template agreement also saps the
constitutional role of the unitary executive by failing to provide
adequate presidential control over 287(g) officers in their execution
of their delegated duties. Compliance with the limitations of the
Appointments Clause, including the power to appoint and remove
officers and employees, comprises a necessary but not sufficient
ingredient in the President’s power to control those wielding
76
executive authority. Those exercising this authority also must remain

care that the laws be faithfully executed.”). Indeed, the text of Article II, Section 3, Clause 5
expresses this obligation, as it is phrased in mandatory terms. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1153, 1199–1201 (1992) (advocating a mandatory understanding of the word “shall” in the
Vesting Clause of Article II).
74. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (“Without a clear and effective chain of
command, the public cannot ‘determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious
measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
70, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961))).
75. The 2009 template agreement anticipates that 287(g) officers acting in both the “jail
model” and the “task force model” will blend their activities pursuant to 287(g) with those
attendant upon their normal law enforcement functions. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra
note 17, at 21 (noting that “jail model” officers will “exercise their immigration-related
authorities only during the course of their normal duties”); id. at 19 (providing that task force
officers will “exercise their immigration-related authorities during the course of criminal
investigations involving aliens”).
76. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing
that “‘the Power to appoint and remove’ those exercising [executive] power” is a minimum
requirement of compliance with the unitary executive theory (quoting Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997))).
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77

subject to “meaningful Presidential control.”
The Supreme Court has had little opportunity to trace the
boundaries of how much control over subordinates carrying out
executive functions is required to register as constitutionally
“meaningful.” Thus far, the Court has had to decide only easier cases,
in which the degree of presidential control from meaningful to none
has fallen decidedly on the “none” side of the spectrum. In Printz, the
Court concluded that the interim regulations on firearm transfer
under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring local
law enforcement authorities to receive certain data about handgun
purchasers and check it against local databases impermissibly eroded
presidential authority by failing to include any means of executive
78
79
oversight. Similarly, in United States v. Lara, Justice Thomas’s
concurrence considered the application of the “meaningful control”
rule to a statute authorizing Indian tribes to prosecute non-members
whose alleged crimes were committed on tribal lands and found that
the statute would undermine the unitary executive if interpreted as
delegating federal authority because it allowed the Executive Branch
80
no oversight role. Most recently, the Court struck down the doublefor-cause removal provision at issue in Free Enterprise Fund, but did
so because of a provision that restricted the President’s removal
power rather than the President’s power to supervise the conduct of
81
subordinates through mechanisms other than removal.
The only clue as to the metes and bounds of how the meaningful
control limitation used in Printz might be applied in a context where
the President retains some degree of supervisory control comes from
82
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison, which predated Printz. In
Morrison, Justice Scalia found inadequate the intentionally sparse
controls allotted to the Executive Branch over an independent
counsel created by Congress to investigate alleged malfeasance by
Reagan administration officials, including then-Assistant Attorney

77. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
78. See id. at 922–23 (voiding the interim reporting provisions based on erosion of
executive power).
79. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
80. See id. at 216 (Thomas, J., concurring) (considering application of Printz to the facts at
hand).
81. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 at 3164 (1986)
(issuing judgment based solely on the removal power constraints).
82. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

SMITH 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

214

10/21/2013 8:18 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 8:1

83

General Theodore Olson. The seven other Justices who heard the
case concluded that the limited executive controls allowed by
84
Congress did not impermissibly erode executive power. In particular,
the majority pointed to the fact that the special counsel’s tenure was
strictly limited; that her jurisdiction was restricted to subject matter
specified by statute; that she was subject to removal, albeit only for
cause, by the Attorney General; that the Attorney General could
disapprove the initiation of her investigation upon finding reasonable
grounds to conclude that no crimes had taken place; and, finally, that
85
the special counsel lacked an independent policymaking function.
Justice Scalia’s dissent emphasized perceived constitutional flaws
in the “for cause” removal provision, but also discussed the reasons
for his disagreement with the Court’s conclusion that the other checks
86
on executive control did not eliminate the Executive’s authority. In
particular, Justice Scalia took account not only of the statute’s formal
provisions, but also acknowledged practical limitations on the
statute’s operation; specifically, he noted that the statute “effectively
compelled” the Attorney General to acquiesce in the initiation of the
special counsel’s investigation because political pressures would
inhibit the Attorney General from exercising his statutory power to
87
quash the investigation within an initial ninety-day window.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison clarifies that, for purposes of
the unitary executive theory, not only formal limitations—such as the
absence of power to appoint and remove—but also practical
88
impediments to the President’s ability to supervise executive officers
are relevant in ascertaining whether these officers are subject to the
“meaningful presidential control” required by his opinion for the
89
Court in Printz. In the context of the 287(g) program, the
amalgamation of executive and non-executive functions performed by
287(g) officers presents such an impediment. In the most literal terms,
83. See id. at 660–69 (majority opinion) (describing how the independent counsel would be
nominated and overseen).
84. See id. at 696–97 (holding that the appointment does not violate the Appointments
Clause or the separation of powers principle).
85. Id. at 670–77.
86. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 703.
88. See id. at 705 (arguing that any impediment that deprives the President of power that is
purely executive is an infringement of the separation of powers principle).
89. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997) (establishing that “meaningful
Presidential control” is required because otherwise Congress could act without the President,
thus shattering the governmental unity).
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the President cannot effectively control the actions of 287(g) field
officers taken pursuant to delegated executive authority when those
officers and their superiors can claim that the very same actions were
in fact authorized by, and taken pursuant to, local law, and therefore
were outside the President’s supervisory authority. Indeed, the 2009
template agreement apparently anticipates such conflicts, as it
requires the signatory local law enforcement agency to report any
90
conflicts between ICE directives and the agency’s rules or policies.
However, the agreement fails to provide any specific procedure for
resolving the conflict, nor does it indicate that orders issued by ICE
and by the President take precedence over conflicting local laws or
91
policies. Thus, the agreement apparently contemplates that orders
issued by federal authorities could be abrogated by state or local
authority. This result is incompatible with the “meaningful
92
Presidential control” over executive functions that the unitary
executive demands.
The lack of meaningful executive control over 287(g) officers
undermines the normative rationales of ensuring “vigor and
93
accountability” in the enforcement of federal law that underpin the
94
unitary executive theory. The public cannot know who to hold
responsible when actions are taken pursuant to such unclear lines of
95
authority. Nor can the President energetically direct the enforcement
of immigration law through 287(g) officials when, as demonstrated by
96
empirical research, the 287(g) program is directed by local priorities
rather than national policy.

90. Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 17, at 6.
91. See id.
92. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
93. Id. at 922; see also Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 37–45 (1994).
94. See Calabresi, supra note 93, at 37–45 (describing the qualities Hamilton believed were
necessary for the executive to maintain a strong stance vis-à-vis the other powers and outside
governments).
95. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155
(2010) (“Without a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot ‘determine on
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures
ought really to fall.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961)).
96. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The Obama administration’s announcement that it will allow
existing 287(g) program agreements to expire marks the end of the
program’s turbulent history. However, despite its impending closure,
the 287(g) program presents an instructive case study in the practical
and theoretical problems inherent in delegating federal immigration
enforcement power to state and local officers. Whereas other studies
have concentrated on the implications of this delegation for
97
federalism, the effects of delegation on the scope of presidential
power under the Take Care Clause and Appointments Clause of
Article II also must be considered. In particular, the unitary executive
theory’s strict emphasis on formal division of authority and executive
control poses doctrinal problems for delegation of federal
immigration enforcement authority in the manner devised by section
287(g). The architects of new federal immigration legislation should
take account of the Article II problems raised by delegation without
greater presidential control. Further, opponents of new federal
immigration enforcement authority that is delegated to state and local
entities should incorporate in their arguments not only federalist
98
norms and civil rights concerns, but also those norms of executive
“vigor and accountability” that are embodied and protected by
Article II.

97. See discussion supra note 2.
98. See discussion supra note 31.

